About Hivra

Authority starts with the participant.

Hivra explores a Person-First Runtime: a locally controlled foundation for identity, authenticated history, and pairwise relationships. The architecture asks which party has authority over each part of an interaction, whether execution happens locally or through a shared service.

The architectural choice

Give each participant its own foundation.

Keys can identify a signer, and storage can hold records. A lasting interaction also needs authenticated history and rules for recognizing the other participant. Capsule brings these together without requiring a Hivra-operated account server, directory, or a personal VPS. Message delivery and external services still need their own available infrastructure.

Local root authority

A Capsule establishes its own signing identity. Transport credentials and provider accounts have separate roles.

Retained state

The runtime process can stop while stored history remains. Recovery of identity and recovery of that history have different requirements.

Bounded application access

Installed software uses host APIs and explicit permissions. Replacing a compatible package does not create a new Capsule identity.

Capsule boundaries

Identity, authority, and history have distinct roles.

Core interprets authenticated domain history. Operational records, application data, and secrets have their own owners and storage boundaries.

Identity

The canonical Capsule identity comes from its local root key. A Nostr key or a service login does not replace it.

Authenticated history

The Ledger records signed Capsule domain facts in an append-only history. Core derives the current state from those facts.

Authority

Root signing authority and application permissions serve different purposes. A transport's ability to deliver gives it neither.

Bounded capability context

The host checks an application's grants and execution context before permitting a capability call.

Application state

Plugin state, external-effect journals, delivery records, and credentials stay in their dedicated stores rather than becoming Ledger facts.

Evidence boundary

Core accepts domain truth through defined transitions; external receipts and journals remain owned by their capability or effect boundary.

What Capsule does not mean

A deliberately bounded foundation.

Not an account A Capsule can use accounts, but it is not itself a provider account.

Private relationships There is no global people search or discovery directory. Public visibility would require a separate higher-level mechanism and a sharing decision.

Domain-specific data Medical histories and financial accounts belong to specialized applications and their participants, outside Capsule Core.

Not a transport identity Network protocols and endpoints are pluggable, not canonical.

Limited scope A Capsule is not a personal cloud, universal database, or replacement operating system. Applications use its defined runtime interfaces.

Trust layer

Two participants, each with their own side.

Foundational relationships are pairwise. Each Capsule keeps its own authenticated side; an application or intermediary cannot produce the other party's valid signature without that party's signing authority. Either party may end its participation, but cannot rewrite the other's signed past. Retained relationships need no continuous activity; updates still depend on delivery, so a local view is not a guarantee of the peer's latest state.

Reusable trust

Applications may use an established relationship when they need a trusted peer. Each side retains its own history independently of the application's availability.

No blanket permission

Mutual recognition does not grant access to private records or authorize an operation. Each capability has its own bounded access requirements.

Protocol details

Starters, slots, invitation lifecycles, and Pair Consensus are defined in the 1.x specification. The State Explorer illustrates local Starter history.

Capabilities and adapters

What applications can and cannot own.

Drones are installed WASM plugins. The host mediates their access to storage, delivery, and external effects. Host-level transport and provider adapters handle external I/O.

Runtime plugins

Chat and Moltbook are maintained application capabilities. Capsule AI Runtime is a shared host capability used by authorized surfaces, not a downloadable drone or Core.

Replaceability

Package replacement depends on compatible host APIs, contracts, grants, and catalog trust. New provider operations may require host changes.

Evidence boundary

Effects and receipts stay tied to the provider or capability boundary and are not merged back as person continuity by default.

External world

Delivery supports the relationship.

Nostr is the currently mounted transport. Its relays carry authenticated messages; they do not define Capsule identity or own the relationship. Delivery still depends on connectivity and available relays. Separation of transport makes replacement possible in the architecture, not automatic for every protocol.

Transport adapters

Transport keys and sessions stay behind host interfaces. Plugins request delivery without receiving those credentials.

Evidence separation

A delivery acknowledgement is operational evidence. It does not by itself create an accepted Capsule domain fact.

Availability has limits

A transport outage does not erase retained local history. It can prevent delivery and leave a participant with an older view of the pair.

Why this matters

Continuity needs both authority and retained history.

Identity recovery The recovery phrase restores the Capsule's identity under a compatible key-derivation version. It does not recreate lost records.
History recovery A compatible verified backup restores the history and operational state included in its format. Independently available authenticated history may help; completeness is not guaranteed.
Separate secrets External service credentials have their own storage and recovery requirements. The Capsule seed does not silently reconstruct them.
Implementation and evidence

What can be tested today.

Status checked on 11 October 2026. v1.0.4-test1 is the latest published test build for macOS and Android. The development status tracks source and plugin work separately; Hivra 2.0 remains design-only.

Implemented in the 1.x test runtime

  • Local root identity, signed Ledger history, and canonical Core projections.
  • Invitation-based pairwise relationships, with transport credentials separate from root authority.
  • WASM package installation and bounded host APIs. See the host API contract.
  • Reproducible domain scenarios in Core tests and packaged release signoff.

Experimental release limits

  • Exact packaged launch and restart checks passed. Full new-user, recovery, and migration qualification remains deferred for this test release.
  • The macOS build is unsigned and not notarized; Android is an internal test APK. Live Moltbook/Gemini effects were not exercised in this release smoke.
  • Plugin availability and individual workflow evidence do not imply that every end-to-end product journey is complete.

Research direction

  • Independent verification of Capsule history and continuation through a separate implementation are distinct research goals.
  • Institutional integrations and public relationship publishing are possible higher-level applications, not implemented features claimed here.
Evaluating the experiment

Different claims need different evidence.

Hivra combines existing primitives with its own ownership boundaries. Tests within one implementation, external artifact checks, and independent implementations answer different questions.

Artifact verification.

External tooling can check published signatures, digests, and package structure. This establishes facts about distributed bytes, not the validity of a Capsule's history.

Independent Ledger verification.

A separate verifier would check authenticated history and its semantics. This remains research beyond package verification.

Independent continuation.

Another implementation would need to continue the same Capsule history under compatible rules. Verifying past records alone would not demonstrate this.

Interoperability limits.

Replacing a plugin or adapter within Hivra does not prove interoperability between independent runtimes. Hivra is not presented as a finished universal standard.

Effect lifecycle

One capability owns the path from goal to outcome.

The plugin owns its decisions and reconciliation rules. The host validates grants and mediates external requests; adapters execute them and return evidence to the same owner.

  • Goal enters capability
  • Capability decides
  • Adapter executes
  • Receipt reconciled
  • Result returns
Person / Capsule Continuity root
Capability Owner Decision + operation ID
Capability Adapter Execution
Receipt / Reconciliation Retry + restart

The effect lifecycle contract requires one owner across retry, restart, and reconnect. External receipts remain with that owner; only defined, accepted domain transitions enter Core/Ledger history.